关键词：
脑/生理学
意识
哲学
心理生理学
意志
人类
摘要：
CHANGING CONCEPTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND FREE WILL* R. W. SPERRYf Introduction Two special properties of the brain not found in other natural systems , as far as we yet know, have always been notoriously difficult for science to deal with—even in principle. The first of these, of course, is conscious awareness, that will-o'-the wisp that science cannot find, cannot demonstrate, measure, or work with and, in most cases, somethingjust the basic nature of which we have been unable to conceive satisfactorily or even imagine. How the brain mechanisms generate subjective conscious experience continues to pose the number one problem for brain research and one ofthe most truly mystifying unknowns remaining in the whole of science. The second brain property that science finds particularly troublesome is free will. Science is concerned with causal relations and can hardly work out the natural laws, predictions, and understanding of a system that fails to obey the principles of lawful causation. One of the earliest rules for animal behavior stated that, when rigorous conditions are established in which all sensory input can be strictly controlled, one may predict for any measured stimulus that an animal will respond "as it damn pleases." This was widely referred to back in the 1930s as the "Chicago Law of Behavior"—or, in Chicago, as the "Harvard Law." It is curious and perhaps not entirely coincidental that these same two brain properties that science finds so unaccountable are commonly considered by practically all of us to be the two most important and most treasured of all our brain faculties. When we have lost consciousness, we have lost most of what makes everything worthwhile, and almost the same can be said for the ability to will our own actions, decisions, utter- *Adapted from a talk presented at York University, Toronto, November 1973, in the Gerstein Lecture Series. The work was aided variously by grant no. MH 03372 from the National Institute of Mental Health, U.S.
